Two launches on the same day. Same problem. Different halves of the answer.
Entro Security launched Agentic Governance & Administration (AGA) — focused on discovering what agents exist, what they connect to, and which identities power them.
Apono launched Agent Privilege Guard — focused on ensuring agents never have more privilege than they need, enforced at runtime, with zero standing privileges.
Both are heading to RSAC 2026 (March 23-27). Together, they illustrate why the agent governance market isn’t converging on a single solution — it’s stratifying into layers.
Entro AGA: Finding the Agents You Don’t Know About
Entro CEO Itzik Alvas frames the problem precisely: “Enterprise AI adoption rarely starts with a strategy deck. It starts with a connection. A developer connects a tool to an LLM, a team installs an AI app in SaaS, or someone authenticates an agent against SharePoint, GitHub, Salesforce, or internal APIs.”
By the time security teams learn about it, the agent is live, connected, and has access to production systems. AGA addresses this with two core capabilities:
Shadow AI Discovery
Not just finding SaaS AI tools and LLMs. Entro discovers the full agent footprint:
- Endpoint telemetry — EDR integrations surface AI clients and local agent runtimes on workstations
- Agent foundries — native integration with AWS Bedrock, Copilot Studio, and other platforms where agents are built
- Cloud environments — discovering the non-human identities (NHIs) agents rely on: OAuth apps, IAM roles, service accounts
- MCP servers — what tools agents connect to and what data flows through them
The output: a single governed view of where every agent runs, what it can access, and which identities power it.
Monitoring and Enforcement
Discovery answers “what exists.” Enforcement answers “what’s allowed.”
AGA provides:
- MCP activity visibility — which tools are invoked, which services are connected
- Policy controls — sanctioned MCP targets, approved AI client behaviors
- Audit trails — allowed and blocked activity logged with full context
- Sensitive data controls — reducing exposure of secrets and confidential data
How AGA Structures Agent Profiles
Every discovered agent gets a structured profile built from three layers:
| Layer | What It Captures |
|---|---|
| Sources | Where the agent runs — endpoints, foundries, cloud environments |
| Targets | What the agent touches — enterprise apps, APIs, data stores |
| Identities | How the agent authenticates — NHIs, OAuth tokens, service accounts, API keys |
This is the same inventory problem that AvePoint’s AgentPulse and Singulr’s Agent Pulse target, but approached from the identity and secrets management layer — Entro’s existing strength.
Apono Agent Privilege Guard: Zero Standing Privileges for Agents
Apono takes a different angle entirely. Their premise: agents should never have standing privileges that can be abused.
Today’s reality is ugly. Co-pilots like GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and Claude Code operate with the full permissions of the developer using them. Autonomous agents are worse — they accumulate privileges and keep them indefinitely. There’s no runtime mechanism governing how those privileges are used.
Agent Privilege Guard introduces Intent-Based Access Controls (IBAC):
How IBAC Works
Every privilege request from an agent is evaluated at the moment it’s made:
- Low-risk actions → automatically approved
- Sensitive operations → routed to a human for approval (via Slack) before execution
- Policy violations → blocked before they run
After each operation:
- All credentials are ephemeral — scoped to the specific task
- Credentials are revoked on completion
- The environment returns to Zero Standing Privileges
No accumulated permissions. No leftover access. No credential drift.
Why This Matters for the Agent Era
Apono CEO Rom Carmel: “Enterprises have already decided to deploy AI agents. The question is whether security can keep up.”
The framing is important. Agent Privilege Guard isn’t trying to slow down agent adoption — it’s trying to make full-speed deployment safe. By controlling privileges at runtime rather than at deployment, security teams can say “yes” to agents without accepting invisible risk.
This directly addresses findings from HiddenLayer’s 2026 threat report: 73% of organizations have internal conflict over who owns AI security. Intent-based access controls sidestep the ownership debate by automating the governance decision at the point of execution.
How These Two Fit Together
| Capability | Entro AGA | Apono Agent Privilege Guard |
|---|---|---|
| Core question | ”What agents exist and what can they access?" | "Should this agent be allowed to do this right now?” |
| Discovery | ✅ Full agent inventory | ❌ Assumes known agents |
| Identity mapping | ✅ NHI, OAuth, service accounts | ✅ All identity types |
| Runtime enforcement | ✅ MCP policy controls | ✅ Intent-based per-action controls |
| Privilege management | ❌ Not primary focus | ✅ Zero standing privileges |
| Human-in-the-loop | ❌ Policy-based | ✅ Slack approval for sensitive ops |
| Audit | ✅ Activity logging | ✅ Full credential lifecycle logging |
An enterprise could reasonably deploy both: Entro to discover and inventory agents, Apono to govern what those agents can do at runtime. They’re complementary, not competitive.
The Expanding Agent Governance Stack
Adding Entro and Apono to the landscape we’ve been tracking:
| Layer | Products | Focus |
|---|---|---|
| Discovery & Inventory | Entro AGA, AvePoint AgentPulse, Singulr Agent Pulse | Find all agents, map connections |
| Identity & Access | ConductorOne, Okta, SailPoint, Deutsche Telekom | Agent identity lifecycle |
| Privilege Management | Apono Agent Privilege Guard, Token Security | Runtime privilege controls |
| Policy Enforcement | AWS Bedrock AgentCore, Entro AGA | Define and enforce boundaries |
| Runtime Security | Manifold, Menlo Security | Endpoint/browser agent protection |
| Supply Chain | Chainguard, ReversingLabs | Agent code and dependency verification |
Six distinct layers. Six months ago, most of these didn’t exist as product categories. The agent security market is forming in real time.
What OpenClaw Users Should Take Away
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Your agents have privileges you haven’t audited — if you’re running OpenClaw with MCP servers, API keys, and system access, the Entro model (source → target → identity mapping) is worth replicating manually even without the product.
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Zero standing privileges is achievable — Apono’s IBAC pattern of ephemeral, scoped credentials can be approximated with careful credential management. Don’t leave permanent API keys in agent configs when short-lived tokens are an option.
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Discovery comes before governance — you can’t govern agents you haven’t inventoried. If you’re running multiple agents (as many OpenClaw setups do), know exactly which agents connect to which services with which credentials.
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The pre-RSAC wave keeps accelerating — we’ve counted 12+ agent security products in 10 days before Entro and Apono. Now it’s 14+. RSAC itself hasn’t even started.